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1. Introduction: Genesis and Purpose of the Convention 
The 22nd Diplomatic Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
closed, on 2 July 2019, with the adoption of the convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decisions in civil and commercial matters, also known as 
Judgments Convention. 
The event is significant to more than one title. It is, on the one hand, because the 
Conference, after a pause of twelve years, has returned to play the most characteristic 
of its tasks, confirming itself capable of complementing the work of maintenance of 
the existing conventions with a properly normative action. The adoption of the 
convention is significant, on the other hand, because with it comes to completion one 
of the most ambitious projects that the Conference has ever pursued: That of giving 
life to a regime of general application, with a universal vocation, on the international 
circulation of judgments. 
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The new instrument, in effect, aims to fill a void. With the exception of the Hague 
Convention of 1 February 1971 on the recognition and execution of foreign 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, which immediately proved to be a 
failure, the only multilateral instruments bearing uniform rules on the effectiveness 
of foreign sentences are in fact of instruments relating to particular matters, such as 
the Geneva Convention of 19 May 1956 on the international road haulage contract 
(CMR), or regional instruments, such as Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012 of 
December 20, 20121 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
                                                          
1 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, entry 
in force from 10 January 2015. See in argument: P.A. NIELSEN, The New Brussels I Regulation, in 
Common Market Law Review, 50 (3), 2013, pp. 503ss. P. HAY, Notes on the European Union’s 
Brussels-I “Recast” Regulation, in The European Legal Forum, 2013, pp. 2ss. M. POHL, Die 
Neufassung der EuGVVO-im Spannungsfeld zwischen Vertrauen und Kontrolle, in Praxis des 
Internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts, 33, 2013, pp. 109ss. A. NUYTS, La refonte du règlement 
Bruxelles I, in Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 2013, pp. 3ss. I.P. BERAUDO, Regards sur 
le nouveau Règlement Bruxelles I sur la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des 
décisions en matière civile et commerciale, in Journal du Droit International, 2013, pp. 742ss. A. 
STAUDINGER, Schiedsspruch und Urteil mit vereinbarten Wortlaut, in Festschrift für Friedrich Graf 
von Westfalen, Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln, 2010, pp. 662ss. V. RIJAVEC, W. JELINEK, W. 
BREHM, Die Erleichterung der Zwangsvollstreckung in Europa, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012, pp. 
214ss.V. PULJKO, Regulation (EU) n. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters with special reference to the relationship between the 
Regulation and arbitration, in Interdisciplinary Management Research, 17, 2015, pp. 4ss. F. GASCÓN-
INCHAUSTI, La reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions dans le règlement Bruxelles I bis, in E. 
GUINCHARD (eds), Le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I bis. Règlement n° 1215/2012 du 12 décembre 
2012 concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière 
civile et commerciale, op. cit., pp. 210ss. See in argument the next cases from the CJEU: C-368/16, 
Assnes Havn v. Navigatos Management (UK) limited of 13 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:546; C-341/16, 
Hanssen Beleggingen v. Tanja Prast-Knippin of 5 October 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:738; C-230/15, 
Brite Strike Techonologies v. Strike Strike Tecnologies SA of 13 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:560; C-
350/14, Lazar v. Allianz SpA of 10 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C.2015:802; C-536/13, Gazprom v. 
Lietuvos Respublika of 4 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:316, all the above cited cases published in 
the electronic reports of the cases. G. PAYAN, Droit européen de l’exécution en matière civile et 
commerciale, ed. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2012. B. KÖHLER, Dual-use contracts as consumer contracts 
and no attribution of consumer status of a third party to the proceedings under Brussels-I Regulation, 
in Praxis des Internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrecht, 37, 2017, n. 6 and in particular the next cases 
from the CJEU: C-70/15, Emmanuel Lebek v. Janusz Domino of 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:524; 
C-12/15, Universal Music International Holding BV v. Michael Tètreault Shilling of 16 June 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:449; C-605/14, Virpi Kom v. Pekka Komu and Jelena Komu of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:833; C-438/12, Irmengard Weber v. Mecthilde Weber of 3 April 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:212, the just cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. In particular 
in this ultimate case the Court has declared that: “(...)  Since the “jurisdiction of the Court first seized 
(could not be) be formally established (…) the Advocate General confirmed (…) that there was no lis 
pendens in operation in this case and proceedings in the Court second seized need not be stayed. He 
relied on dicta (…) to justify that it was inappropriate for it to stay proceedings pending before it (…) 
the justification for the “reliable assessment” this was premised on the fact that the Court first seized 
did not have jurisdiction and could not therefore either determine the question of lis pendens nor issue 
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civil and commercial matters (Brussels I bis) or the Lugano Convention of October 
30, 20071, establishing a “parallel” regime to that of Brussels. 
                                                          
a judgment capable of recognition under Articles 35(1) and 45(1) (...)”. We continue with the next 
cases: C-218/02, Lokman Emrek v. Vlado Sabranovic of 17 October 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:62, I-
01241; C-190/11, Daniela Mühlleitner v. Ahmad Yusufi of 6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:542, 
published in the electronic Reports of the cases. See, J.P. BERAUDO, Regards sur le nouveau 
règlement Bruxelles I sul la compètence judiciaire, la reconnaisssance et l'exècution des dècisions en 
matière civile et commerciale, op. cit., pp. 742ss. L. GRARD, La communautarisation de “Bruxelles 
I”, in Revue Gènèrale de Droit International Public, 117 (4), 2013, pp. 530ss. P. BEAUMONT, M. 
DANON, K. TRIMMINGS, B. YÜKSEL, Cross-border litigation in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
& Oregon, Portland, 2017. F. GASCÓN-INCHAUSTI, La reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions 
dans le règlement Bruxelles I bis, in E. GUINCHARD (eds), Le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I bis. 
Règlement n° 1215/2012 du 12 décembre 2012 concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance 
et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, ed. Larcier, Bruxelles, 2014, pp. 210ss. 
D. LIAKOPOULOS, European integration and its relation with the jurisprudence of European 
Court of Human Rights and private international law of European Union, in Homa 
Publica.Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos e Impresa, 2 (2), 2018. D. LIAKOPOULOS, 
Interactions between European Court of Human Rights and private international law of 
European Union, in Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 10 (1), 2018. 
1 The CJEU has issued an important decision that is halfway between the lis pendens and the question 
of the circulation of decisions. CJEU, C-456/11, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AGcontro Samskip 
GmbH of 15 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:719, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
The dispute concerns a lawsuit for damages caused by the Samskip carrier to a brewery plant 
transported to Mexico on behalf of the German company Krones, brought by Krones itself and by four 
insurance companies. The particularity is that the parties are acting in Germany before the Landgericht 
Bremen only after the decision of the Hof van beroep of Antwerp declares the defect of the Belgian 
jurisdiction on the basis of a clause on the jurisdiction contained in the bill of lading, which elects 
Iceland which competent forum. The clause in favor of the Icelandic judge falls within the Lugano 
system and not in the context of Regulation 44/2001, but the issue of the effectiveness of the Belgian 
judgment in Germany is a matter for Brussels I. Following the defenses carried out by the carrier, the 
Landgericht considers it appropriate to request the interpretation of the CJEU whether the Belgian 
decision is binding on the German court and to what extent. In particular, the judge asked whether (1) 
in the notion of “decision” the decisions which are exhausted in ascertaining the absence of the 
procedural conditions of admissibility (so-called merely procedural sentences), such as (2) a final 
judgment of the degree, are also included of judgment, by which the court seised declines its 
international jurisdiction on the basis of a clause conferring jurisdiction and specifically if (3) each 
Member State is obliged to recognize the decisions issued by the court of another Member State 
concerning the effectiveness a clause conferring jurisdictional rights stipulated inter partes, when, 
according to the national law of the judge of the country of origin, the verification of the effectiveness 
of this clause has the authority of res judicata, even if the decision in this regard constitutes part of a 
merely procedural sentence that rejected the appeal (paragraph 21). The European court, taking up the 
ranks of its previous case-law as a point of recognition, before the circulation regime? “also applies to 
a decision by which the court of a Member State declines its jurisdiction on the basis of a clause 
conferring jurisdiction, regardless of the classification of that decision under the law of another Member 
State” (paragraph 32). It therefore concludes that "the judge before whom the recognition of a decision 
by which the court of another Member State has declined its competence on the basis of a jurisdiction 
clause is bound is bound by the ascertainment of the validity of this clause, contained in the justification 
of a decision, which has become final, declaring the inadmissibility of the action “(paragraph 43). For 
further details see also: T.C. HARTLEY, Choice of Court Agreements under the european and 
international instruments: The Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention and the Hague 
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The purpose of judgments Convention, as stated in the preamble, is to facilitate the 
circulation of decisions. The idea, which is not new in itself, is that, in order to 
promote the development of transnational relationships between private individuals, 
it is good to ensure that those concerned can easily assert their rights based on a 
decision made in a given country anywhere this is necessary. That is, they can project 
the effects of the decision in question outside the country of origin, without excessive 
limitations, and in any case on internationally homogeneous conditions. And this to 
implement judge's command (typically, in the event of a conviction, to demand the 
forced execution of that command in the country where the debtor possesses assets 
that can be assaulted), either to oppose the res judicata to those who essentially claim 
to reopen, in one country, a dispute already settled in another definitively. 
Basically, it is the same objective that the Hague Conference pursued with the 
convention of 30 June 2005 on the exclusive election agreements of the forum, 
currently in force in relation to the European Union, Mexico, Singapore and a few 
others states. The conventions of 2005 and 2019, moreover, are linked by a very 
close relationship, constituting, in essence, distinct outcomes of a single enterprise, 
still launched in the early 1990s of the last century. As noted in the preamble to the 
most recent of the two texts, the Convention of 2019 and that of 2005 are in fact 
complementary instruments, designed to operate jointly and characterized, according 
to this, by a largely common language. 
 
2. General Characters 
The 2019 Convention obeys, in its layout, a completely traditional scheme. In a 
nutshell, it lists, on the one hand, the conditions under which a Contracting State (the 
requested state) has the obligation to recognize, and possibly declare enforceable, 
decisions coming from another Contracting State (the state of origin). On the other 
hand, the Convention indicates the circumstances in which the authorities of the 
requested state are authorized to deny the recognition or execution of a decision for 
which, otherwise, the obligation indicated above would exist. 
The conditions that qualify a decision as eligible for recognition pertain, in 
particular, to its origin. To this end, the Convention prepares jurisdictional “filters”, 
or criteria of international or indirect competence. In fact, it subordinates the 
                                                          
Convention, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, pp. 4-6, 129-130. R. GARNETT, Substance and 
procedure in private international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2012, pp. 105ss. 
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recognition of a judgment to the fact that it has been rendered in a country with which 
the case presents a connection that the Convention itself considers to be congruous. 
The judgment Convention is, in this sense, a “simple” convention, not a “double” 
convention, as was the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on the recognition 
of judgments1, a predecessor tool of the aforementioned Brussels I bis regulation. 
Unlike the double regimes, which combine the unification of the rules on the 
circulation of decisions with the introduction of uniform rules conferring 
jurisdiction, the 2019 Convention merely performs the first of the two functions, 
leaving the contracting states free to trace how they believe the scope of the 
jurisdiction of their own judges. The jurisdictional filters used by the judgment 
Convention can, of course, indirectly influence the physiognomy of the rules 
attributing the jurisdiction of the contracting states to the extent that they allow the 
use of jurisdiction titles other than those that the Convention identifies as adequate. 
The Contracting states in fact prevent the decisions of their judges, if based on those 
titles, from benefiting from the circulation regime established by the Convention. 
This could actually induce the contracting states to align their jurisdiction rules with 
conventional filters, but such a development is in no way imposed by the 
Convention. 
On the contrary, the freedom of maneuver that the contracting states retain in the 
field of jurisdiction is in a certain sense amplified by art. 15 of the Convention, 
pursuant to which-except for an exception which will be discussed below-nothing 
prevents the contracting states from recognizing a decision coming from another 
Contracting State even when the latter does not meet the jurisdictional requirements 
established by the Convention itself (or however, it does not conform to the uniform 
regime in some respects), where recognition is possible under the relevant provisions 
                                                          
1 Already with reference to the 1968 Brussels Convention, the CJEU had lastly referred to the citation 
note of a manifest and immense “violation” of a fundamental right, based on the exceptional nature of 
the limit of public order. See in the same spirit the case. CJEU, C-394/07, Gambazzi of 2 April 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:219, I-02563, par. 33. the English procedural law opens up, to be true, a rather 
unhelpful remedy for the unsuccessful party sentenced to be default and which does not appear in line 
with art. 47 CFREU. This is the application to set aside, provided for by Rule 13 Cpr, whose acceptance 
requires the demonstration of a realistic prospect of resisting the demand (Godwin v. Swindon BC 
82001) 4 ER 641, for May Lj; Akram v. Adam 820049 EWCA Civ. 1601; ED & F may prodcuts ltd v. 
Patel & Anr, 82003), EWCA Civ. 472, Potter LJ; standard bank Plc v. Sgrivest International inc., 82010, 
EWCA Civ. 1400, moore-bick LK. The imposition of unnatural and higher charges and probative 
standards for the default, than would be for the defendant constituted. The limitation of the right to the 
trial of the default; the absence of judgment, if not indirectly, as a reflection of the validity of the 
impedimental, amending, extinctive facts deduced from the dispute, on the constituting facts of the right 
asserted by the plaintiff and the discretionality of the return in the defensive powers of the involuntary 
default make this remedy a blunt weapon. 
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of the requested state. In practice, the Convention provides a series of opportunities 
for the circulation of sentences between the contracting states, without claiming that 
those opportunities are the only ones possible within its field of application. The use 
of attribution titles other than those contemplated by the Convention does not tout 
court the circulation of the decision in the contracting states, but simply deprives 
such decision of the advantages inherent in the Convention, without precluding 
(beyond the case of which it will be said) that same be recognized in those states by 
another way. 
The judgment Convention also differs in this respect from the 2005 Convention on 
the agreements of election of the forum, of which also, as mentioned, generally 
represents the complement. The 2005 Convention, a genuinely double instrument, 
imposes, on the contrary, on states that are bound by it particularly stringent 
obligations on the terrain of jurisdiction. Dealing with agreements aimed at investing 
the judges of a certain state with an exclusive competence, the 2005 Convention 
requires that the extended court exercise the jurisdiction thus conferred, and at the 
same time requires that the judges of any other Contracting State refrain from taking 
cognizance of the questions covered by the agreement of the parties. Moreover, only 
the decisions made by the elected judge circulate in the contracting states by virtue 
of that Convention. 
 
3. Scope of Application 
The Convention deals with the effectiveness, in a Contracting State, of the decisions 
(only those expressing a cognitive judicial activity, excluding therefore 
precautionary measures) rendered by the authorities of another Contracting State in 
civil or commercial matters (they are likewise assimilated to the decisions, for the 
spending of the relative executive effects, the judicial transactions, where the 
conditions foreseen for this purpose are met). The Convention does not indicate how 
the adjectives “civil” and “commercial” should be understood, except to clarify that 
tax, customs and administrative provisions are outside its material sphere. 
Furthermore, as is clear from the draft explanatory report prepared by Francisco 
Garcimartín Alférez and Geneviève Saumier, it is not disputed that the 
aforementioned expressions, as in general the technical-legal formulas used in the 
Convention, should be reconstructed in an autonomous key, and not as a 
postponement to the notions of a particular national legal system. Moreover, art. 20 
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requires the interpretation of the Convention taking into account its international 
character and the need to promote its uniform application. 
In fact, the material scope of the Convention is limited to judgments given by state 
authorities concerning private causes. Hence the exclusion of arbitration, explicitly 
stated in art. 2, par. 3, and the statement, in art. 2, par. 5, that the Convention does 
not in any way affect the privileges and immunities of states and international 
organizations. The public nature of the cases for which those privileges and 
immunities subsist places the relative sentences outside the bounds of the uniform 
regime, but the clarification has nevertheless seemed appropriate. 
The Convention, in reality, does not fully embrace civil and commercial matters, 
understood in this way. Article. 2, par. 2, indeed provides a long list of excluded 
subjects. Some reflect the politically sensitive nature of the interests they deal with 
in decisions relating to certain segments of private law, such as decisions on state 
and capacity and in succession or in general family decisions. The exclusion of such 
decisions from the field of application of the Convention reflects the widespread 
perception of the need to elaborate, for the recognition of judgments concerning 
those sectors, special rules, adapted to the material values at stake. In fact, the 
judgment Convention essentially concerns the circulation of decisions relating to 
private equity transactions, whether of a contractual, extra-contractual or real nature. 
Even in this context, however, the applicability of the Convention is limited. 
Bankruptcy decisions, in broad agreement, are excluded from the uniform regime, 
as are, among others, decisions concerning the validity and dissolution of legal 
persons and other entities, and those concerning registrations and transcriptions in 
public registers. They are also excluded, because they are the subject (at least in part) 
of special agreements, often bearing special rules on recognition, decisions relating 
to the transport of goods and passengers, those concerning marine pollution and 
those relating to liability arising from nuclear accidents. 
Intellectual property is also included among the excluded subjects. The inclusion of 
the decisions in this area in the sphere of the judgment Convention formed the object 
of discussion until the final phase of the negotiation, when it became clear that the 
states opposed to inclusion were unavailable to consider any solution on this ground 
of compromise. 
A different fate has been given to another sensitive subject, that of competition 
decisions. During the Diplomatic Session, the closing positions taken by a small 
number of states did not prevent the acceptance of a solution of cautious inclusion, 
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transfused in article 2, par. 1, lett. p), so that the Convention applies to decisions 
relating to a list of antitrust law issues, on condition that these are decisions coming 
from the country in which both the conduct in question and its effects are produced. 
The difficulties encountered in the negotiation in reaching widely shared solutions 
as regards the delimitation of the material sphere of the Convention are found in art. 
18. It is envisaged that states that have a “strong interest” in not applying the 
Convention to a particular segment of civil or commercial matters may issue a 
declaration to this effect, making sure that their scope is not “wider than necessary”. 
The declaration made for this title-in practice, a particular species of reserve-exempts 
the declaring state from the obligation to apply the Convention to the decisions 
included in the matter indicated, and at the same time exempts the other states from 
the same obligation when it comes to relative decisions to this subject coming from 
the declaring state. 
The Convention clarifies, in art. 8, how the decisions which, although pronouncing 
on a matter included in the application sphere of the Convention, also deal with 
issues outside of it, for the purposes of the agreement regime. Article. 8, par. 1, 
establishes that, for the head of the decision that has established in a subject 
excluded, the Convention has no effects. On the other hand, pursuant to art. 8, par. 
2, the contracting states may deny the recognition and enforcement of a decree per 
se comprised in the material sphere of the Convention if, and to the extent that, it is 
based on a decision concerning an excluded matter. The solution accepted in the final 
text reflects the concerns expressed by states reluctant to bring decisions relating to 
certain sensitive matters, and in particular intellectual property, back under the 
Convention. The exclusions decided in art. 2 come out reinforced. Various 
hypotheses of compromise were proposed in the final phase of the negotiation with 
the aim of ensuring the recognition of decisions based on a ruling relating to an 
excluded subject (especially along the lines of the provisions of art. 8, par. 3, of the 
2005 Convention), but on none of these hypotheses was it possible to coagulate the 
consent of the states involved in the negotiations. 
4. The So-Called Jurisdictional Filters 
The Convention contains provisions on the so-called international jurisdiction of the 
court of origin, or indirect jurisdiction. It thus outlines, in a uniform way, a classic 
requisite for recognition and execution that assumes importance in contexts 
characterized by a lower degree of mutual trust than that which, for example, 
permeates European civil judicial cooperation. 
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Indeed, the multiplicity, variety and different inspiration of the principles underlying 
the exercise of jurisdiction in each state could have discouraged the inclusion of 
uniform criteria on indirect competence or hindered the identification of common 
principles. Think, for example, of the role of the forum (non) conveniens, unknown 
to or even forbidden in many jurisdictions, or to the obligatory presentation of a 
counterclaim for not incurring the forfeiture of the action, which is also uncommon 
globally. 
The text expresses a cautious feeling of equivalence towards the aforementioned 
principles with the result that the respect, sometimes very detailed, of only one of 
the connecting factors between controversy and state of origin indicated in art. 5 
allows the sentence to circulate. 
In this regard, they can detect factors of various kinds. Article. 5, par. 1, uses 
alternatively the habitual residence of the party against whom the recognition and 
execution are requested or its main business location in competition with the 
circumstance that the dispute arose from the conduct of such business; the presence 
of a branch, an agency or a dependency of the defendant combined with the fact that 
the dispute arose from the activities carried out by these secondary offices; the place 
of performance of the contractual obligation deducted in court (place identified by 
the parties or by the lex contractus, provided that there is a real link between 
defendant's activities and state of origin); the presence of the property in the event 
of disputes from rental contracts or contractual disputes concerning services 
guaranteed by real estate when the application also relates to the real guarantee right; 
the location of the deed or event generating the damage in cases involving non-
contractual liability falling within the scope of the agreement; the principal place of 
administration of the trust in the event of disputes relating to a trust (the criterion 
competes with that of the choice of court agreement). 
They also note, alternatively the quality of the actor in the process of origin of the 
person against whom recognition and execution are requested; the express 
acceptance of jurisdiction by the defendant or its tacit acceptance resulting from the 
defense of merit experienced without raising the jurisdiction defect-or without 
invoking the displacement of jurisdiction due to the forum non conveniens-in the 
terms imposed by the law of origin (unless it is evident that the jurisdiction 
exception, although raised in terms, would have had no effect according to the same 
law); the non-exclusive extension of jurisdiction (for the exclusive extension of the 
aforementioned 2005 Convention). 
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With regard to disputes concerning consumer or labor contracts, art. 5, par. 2, called 
a restrictive regulation, under which some jurisdictional filters of art. 5, par. 1, must 
be considered inoperative (this is the case, in particular, of the filter of the contractual 
matter, centered on the locus solutionis criterion), while other filters operate only 
when particular circumstances are involved (so, for example, the acceptance of 
jurisdiction by the defendant operates as a criterion of indirect competence only if it 
is expressed before the court). 
For disputes relating to residential rentals of properties, pursuant to art. 5, par. 3, a 
single filter, that of the situs rei. Article 6 concerns sentences concerning real rights 
on immovable property. These are subtracted from the filters of art. 5 to be delivered 
to a rule of exclusive indirect jurisdiction, by virtue of which the sentences in 
question are effective if, and only if, they come from the state of the situs rei. This 
is the only situation in which, as anticipated, the Convention - in addition to imposing 
the recognition of judgments that satisfy the conditions in it - requires states to refrain 
from recognizing a provision that, conversely, does not come from the country 
designated by the filter. This solution is corroborated by the clarification made in art. 
15, that the freedom granted to the contracting states to give effect according to their 
own internal rules to judgments that do not integrate the conventional requirements 
does not exist with respect to the falling decisions referred to in art. 6. 
With specific regard to the sentences rendered on counterclaims, the agreement 
distinguishes between sentences of acceptance and of rejection. With regard to the 
former, the counterclaim must derive from the same facts or from the same 
relationship on the sensu side underlying the main claim (in the absence of such a 
common derivation, the sentence may nevertheless circulate if other requirements 
occur, such as, for example, habitual residence of the principal actor in the state of 
origin). The close connection between the two questions is not required in the event 
of a rejection sentence, but the sentence will not be able to circulate thanks to the 
requisite in question if the applicant was obliged to promote the counterclaim for not 
having to face exclusions. 
5. The Conditions of Recognition and Procedure 
As noted, the Convention aims to create a uniform body of core rules. If this 
objective, so to speak minimalist, has been achieved also in the discipline of 
conditions impeding recognition, with regard to the exequatur procedure the 
consensus has not been reached on a uniform core procedure that draws inspiration, 
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as a result of compromise and balance, from national ones. The result is that the 
procedure is governed by the law of the requested state (article 13). 
The reference to national law-which must be determined taking into account the rules 
of operation applicable in the case of multi-legislative systems (articles 22 and 25)-
is not however total because the Convention, in addition to imposing to proceed 
expeditiously and not to refuse recognition because the request should have been 
presented in another state (art. 13), expressly regulates some aspects of the 
procedure, such as, in particular, the documentation with which the petitioner is 
required to accompany the request for recognition or execution (art. 12). In addition, 
art. 14 prohibits the submission of the request for recognition to cautionary deposits 
or other forms of guarantees solely because the applicant is a foreigner with respect 
to the requested state or in this neither domiciled or resident. It is a rule that is 
certainly obsequious to the right of access to justice, which, however, states can 
exclude using the reserve referred to in the same art. 14. 
In order to circulate, the sentence must meet certain requirements and not run into 
certain impediments. On closer inspection, most of the positive recognition 
requirements correspond to the jurisdictional filters described above. On the other 
hand, the lack of positive requirements is equivalent to an impediment implied by 
recognition. Naturally, upstream of any evaluation on the susceptibility of the 
sentence to circulate there is the ascertainment that the Convention is applicable. 
This verification, according to art. 4, par. 2, should be conducted in an area of 
investigation marked by the ban on review of the merit. 
In addition to jurisdictional filters, the Convention requires that the sentence be 
capable of producing effects (of judgment) where recognition is required, and that it 
is enforceable, if its execution is required. Both conditions must be ascertained 
according to the law of the state of origin (article 4). 
The impediments are mainly listed in art. 7 and justify a check on the regularity of 
institution and the procedure of origin, on the compatibility of the sentence with the 
public order of the requested state (including the procedural public order and the 
protection of the security and sovereignty of the state itself), on the prohibition of 
fraud on the law, on compliance with jurisdictional extension agreements, on the 
compatibility of the judgment in question with judgments pronounced between the 
same parties in the requested state or with previous sentences rendered on the same 
dispute also pronounced elsewhere but capable of being recognized in the requested 
state, on lis pendens in favor of the judges of that state provided that there is a close 
connection between the latter and the dispute. 
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Article 9 allows, then, a partial circulation of the sentence when the request for 
recognition concerns only a part of the sentence, or when the sentence can be 
recognized only partially due to the recognition requisites or the impeding 
conditions. A particular impediment is provided for in art. 10 with regard to decisions 
to condemn and exemplary or punitive damages. These decisions may not be 
recognized, or partially recognized, for the strictly compensatory portion. 
States can offer their judges, through the appropriate declaration provided for by art. 
17, the faculty to refuse entry of the sentence if the parties to the dispute are resident 
in the requested state and present, together with any other element of the dispute 
other than the location of the judge of origin, connections only with that state. 
 
6. Relation of the Agreement with Other Rules on Recognition 
The phenomenon that the judgment Convention proposes to regulate is the object, as 
mentioned above, of internationally uniform norms envisaged in various other 
instruments: Bilateral and multilateral conventions, and regional instruments. The 
rules governing the coordination of the Convention with these other texts are 
contained in art. 23. 
First of all, the law (or, better, remember) that any conflicts between uniform regimes 
must be composed, where possible, on an interpretative level. 
For its part, art. 23, par. 2, subordinates the Convention to pre-existing treaties, while 
par. 3 clarifies that the Convention does not affect the application of the subsequent 
treaties, as this does not compromise the observance of art. 6 with respect to state 
party to the Convention which are not parties to the treaty. 
Article 23, par. 4, concerns the relation between the Convention and the rules 
contained in an instrument adopted by a regional economic integration organization, 
such as the Union. Essentially it concerns relation with the Brussels I bis Regulation. 
The solution is identical to that already illustrated with regard to the treaties: The 
pre-existing rules are preserved, while the subsequent ones are intended to prevail 
over the Convention, in its field of application, except for the respect of art. 6. 
In practice, if and when the 2019 Convention comes into force for the Union, the 
regime established therein will not affect the operation of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation with respect to the decisions subject to it (those made in a EU member 
state, in as invoked in another member state), even if pronounced, by hypothesis, in 
relation to a real estate action relating to a property located in a third state, part of 
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the Convention. Each subsequent regional regulation must instead guarantee, in the 
latter scenario, compliance with the obligations arising by art. 6 of the Convention. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks and Possible Developments 
The conclusion of the judgment Convention falls within the exclusive external 
competence of the Union. It is plausible that the Union resolves to express its consent 
to be bound in a relatively short time. The negotiation, albeit marked by the rejection 
of some of the solutions advocated by the Union, sometimes on particularly 
qualifying points of the text, resulted in the adoption of a text which, as a whole, 
appears to be fundamentally compliant with the outlined auspices, in due time, by 
the institutions1. 
The interest in the Convention expressed by the delegations of some non-European 
states suggests that other instruments of ratification can be deposited in a not too 
long time frame. 
However, it is not realistic to expect any significant development in the immediate 
term. For the delegations engaged in the negotiation it is likely to be a priority, in 
this phase, to supervise the drafting of the final version of the explanatory report, 
expressing, according to a procedure defined by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Conference, any comments on the final draft that will be finalized in the coming 
weeks. 
The entry into force of the Convention is subject to the deposit of just two 
instruments of ratification or accession. It is also useful to point out how the 
judgment Convention, taking up (moreover with various improvements) a 
controversial approach already experimented with the mentioned Convention of 
1971, provides for a mechanism of “bilateralization” of relation between contracting 
states. Article 29 in fact contemplates the possibility that a state, at the time of 
expressing its consent to be bound by the Convention, declares that this consent does 
not constitute a relationship established by the Convention between itself and another 
contracting state. Conversely, each Contracting State may declare that the 
ratification or accession of a certain state will not have the effect of giving rise to a 
relationship between that state and itself. 
                                                          
1 See the text, only partially declassified, of the recommendation for a Council decision concerning the 
start of negotiations, Council of the EU, Brussels 8 June 2017, 7746/16 EXT 1, JUSTCIV 51. 
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The burden thus prefigured with regard to the procedure (and at the time) of 
ratifications and accessions reflects, once again, the politically sensitive nature of the 
matters governed by the Convention and the desire of individual states to maintain 
their international treatment under their respective sphere of control. 
In the coming months, when the states and the European Union have just begun to 
assess what steps to take with regard to the Convention, the Hague Conference will 
be called upon to decide whether to start a reflection on the adoption of a possible 
future instrument with standards attributing jurisdiction in civil and commercial 
matters. In the conclusions of the meeting held between 5 and 8 March 20191, the 
Council on General Affairs and Conference Policy gave a mandate to the Permanent 
Bureau to convene the group of experts who assisted the Conference in relation to 
the Judgment Project. The results of the meeting will be discussed by the Council in 
the spring of 2020. 
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